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The Washington State Environmental Policy Act 2
("SEPA") provides the basic framework for review of all major
development proposals3 having a probable significant impact4
upon the quality of the environment.5 SEPA requires both
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2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (1989).
3. "Proposals" include agency actions and applications submitted to agencies for
approval. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-784 (1990). "Building permit applications
and subdivision plat applications are typical of this latter type of proposal." Roger
Pearce, Comment, Death by SEPA: Substantive Denials Under Washington's State
Environmental Policy Act, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 143, 144 (1990).
4. Under SEPA, significant impact means a reasonable likelihood of more than a
moderate impact on environmental quality. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-794 (1990).
5. The general policies of SEPA are as follows:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the state of Washington and all agencies of the
state to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of state policy, to improve and coordinate plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the state and its citizens may:
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(d) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage;
(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity
and variety of individual choice;
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
958 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 15:957
public and private projects to comply with its provisions.6
Compliance with SEPA may significantly impact the economic
feasibility of completing a project if the project proponent is
required, by the appropriate government agency, to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") v because the prepa-
ration of an EIS causes additional costs and delays to the
project.8
The costs of complying with SEPA may extend past com-
pletion of an EIS. If new information arises after preparation
of the EIS, but before completion or upon modification of the
project, the new information must also be evaluated by the
agency.9 After evaluating this new information, the agency
may require a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
("SEIS"), 10 and this requirement adds further costs to the pro-
ject in terms of delay and money.
An SEIS must be prepared if substantial changes in the
proposal are made or if new information indicates probable sig-
nificant adverse economic impacts that were not adequately
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) (1989).
6. While SEPA only directly imposes environmental responsibility on
governmental actions, it indirectly constrains private land development. Almost all
private development requires governmental permits, and SEPA specifically applies to
governmental regulatory decisions. Private development proposals are thus indirectly
regulated by SEPA. RICHARD L. SETTLE, THE WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS 4-2 (2d Supp. 1991).
7. An Environmental Impact Statement is required for "proposals... significantly
affecting the quality of the environment." WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (1989);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-330 (1990).
Additionally, on the basis of information generated in compliance with SEPA,
private development projects that might otherwise have been granted may be denied.
See, e.g., Buchsei/Donard, Inc. v. Skagit County, 99 Wash. 2d 577, 663 P.2d 487 (1983);
West Main Assoc. v. City of Bellevue, 49 Wash. App. 513, 742 P.2d 1266 (1987), review
denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1009 (1989).
8. See Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (holding that
delay incurred because of improperly required EIS, resulting in damages of $969,000
for lost profits, loss of favorable financing, and increased construction costs because of
inflation, cost of first EIS, and attorney's fees). "Perhaps the most significant and
controversial consequence of SEPA has been delay of both public and private projects.
The delay caused by administrative compliance with SEPA procedures and litigation
challenging administrative compliance may render projects economically infeasible
.... SEPA challenges designed solely to delay unpopular projects are imperminssible."
SETTLE, supra note 6, at 37.
9. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-600(4)(c), -706 (1990).
10. Id. §§ 197-11-405(4), -600(4)(d). Preparation of an SEIS follows substantially
the same procedure as an EIS. Id. § 197-11-620.
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covered in the EIS.11 On the other hand, the agency may
decide that an SEIS is not required because the underlying EIS
is adequate in light of this new information. The agency deter-
mination not to require the project proponent to prepare an
SEIS is essentially the same as a so-called "negative threshold
determination" where an agency finds no significant adverse
impacts and does not require preparation of an EIS.
Similar to the decision of whether an EIS must be pre-
pared, an agency decision of whether to require preparation of
an SEIS has important economic consequences for the project.
The success or failure of a project depends, among other
things, on the proponent's ability to forecast the project's cost.
An agency's decision to require preparation of an SEIS
increases the project cost, and therefore, predictability of an
agency's decision whether to require an SEIS is a crucial ele-
ment of a proponent's economic forecast.
Unfortunately, a project proponent's ability to forecast
costs is undercut by the unpredictable results of judicial review
of agency decisions not to require preparation of an SEIS
under Washington law. Under Washington law, judicial review
of an agency decision not requiring preparation of a SEIS may
produce unpredictable results because different standards of
judicial review are applied to EIS adequacy and to the negative
threshold determinations.' 2 The uncertainty surrounding the
standard of judicial review imposes economic costs on the pro-
ject in terms of increased project cost and delay. Additionally,
the uncertain standard increases the risk that a project oppo-
nent will bring litigation solely for the purposes of delaying
the project and, accordingly, imposes on the project proponent
risks associated with defending the litigation.
To enable citizens opposing projects and proponents
defending projects to predict more accurately the results of liti-
gation and to discourage spurious litigation, a more definitive
standard of judicial review is necessary. This Article proposes
11. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-405(4), -600(4)(d) (1990).
12. Generally, the court reviews EIS adequacy under a de novo standard. Leschi
Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash. 2d 271, 284-85,
525 P.2d 774, 784 (1974). However, negative threshold determinations are reviewed
under either the arbitrary or [sic] capricious or clearly erroneous standard.
Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 423, 526 P.2d 897,
902 (1974) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review), overruled by
Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267,
274, 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976) (applying the clearly erroneous standard of review).
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a standard of judicial review that encompasses components of
both the adequacy and negative threshold standards of judicial
review. The proposed standard of review discourages lawsuits
that are brought merely for purposes of delay while ensuring
that the agency acted reasonably in making its determination.
Before this new standard can be considered, the context in
which it will operate must be reviewed. Part II of this Article
discusses the statutory scheme of SEPA. Part III discusses the
statutory mandate that requires courts to accord agency deci-
sions substantial weight and discusses three different standards
of judicial review that have developed from case law. Next,
Part IV proposes the new standard of review. Finally, Part V
compares this proposed standard with the holding of the recent
Washington Court of Appeals case of West 514, Inc. v. County
of Spokane13 to substantiate the validity of the proposed
standard.
II. SEPA STATUTORY SCHEME
Broadly stated, SEPA requires state and local governmen-
tal agencies to evaluate proposed projects in order to maintain
and improve environmental quality. 4 The principle mecha-
nism for implementing SEPA policy is the EIS. Although
SEPA procedure centers around the EIS, 5 the threshold deter-
mination is whether an EIS must be prepared.
During the threshold determination process, the govern-
ment agency 16 or the lead agency'" must determine whether or
not the project is likely to have probable, significant adverse
13. 53 Wash. App. 838, 770 P.2d 1065, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
14. See SETLE, supra note 6, at 4-1; see, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality
Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 707, 601 P.2d 501, 515 (1979); Eastlake Community Council
v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 490, 513 P.2d 36, 46 (1973).
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010 (1989) states that the purposes of SEPA are as
follows:
(1) to declare a state policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; (2) to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere; (3) to
stimulate the health and welfare of man; and (4) to enrich the understanding
of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the state and
nation.
SEPA states "that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment." William H. Rogers, Jr., The
Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REV. 33, 34 (1984) (quoting WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1983)).
15. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-400 to -460 (1990).
16. SEPA requirements are applicable to all agencies or units of state and local
[Vol. 15:957
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impacts on the environment.1 8  To make this determination,
the lead agency must designate a responsible official to be spe-
cifically accountable for complying with SEPA procedural
requirements.' 9 The responsible official within the lead agency
then documents the threshold determination by either a Deter-
mination of Significance, a Determination of Non-Signifi-
cance,2 0 or a Mitigated Determination of Non-Significance.2
A Determination of Significance indicates that the agency
found significant adverse impacts (a positive threshold deter-
mination), and the project proponent must prepare an EIS22 .
A Determination of Non-Significance indicates that the agency
found no significant adverse impacts (negative threshold deter-
mination), and the project proponent is not required to prepare
an EIS.23 A Mitigated Determination of Non-Significance indi-
cates that the agency found environmentally significant
impacts but will allow the project to be modified to avoid a
Determination of Significance.2 4
If the agency requires an EIS, the project proponent must
prepare a draft EIS,25 which the agency makes available to the
public and sends to agencies with jurisdiction.2 6 Any person or
agency may review and comment on a draft EIS within thirty
days from the date of issuance.2 After review and evaluation
of any comments, the project proponent prepares a Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement, which is distributed by the lead
agency.
28
government except the judiciary and state legislature. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.030(2) (1989); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-714(1), -762, -796 (1990).
17. If more than one governmental agency is involved in an action, a designation
of "lead agency" must be made. The lead agency is responsible for compliance with
threshold determination and EIS requirements. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 197-11-050, -
922 -948 (1990).
18. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-330(1) (1990).
19. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-788 (1990). The SEPA regulation defines
"responsible official" as follows: "officer or officers, committee, department, or section
of the lead agency designated by agency SEPA procedures to undertake its procedural
responsibilities as lead agency." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-910 (1990).
20. Id. § 197-11-310(2)-(4).
21. Id. § 197-11-350.
22. Id. § 197-11-360(1).
23. Id. § 197-11-340.
24. Id. § 197-11-350.
25. The lead agency may have an EiS prepared by an applicant. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 197-11-420(2) (1990).
26. Id. § 197-11-455.
27. I. § 197-11-455(6)-(7).
28. Id. § 197-11-560(4).
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After the project proponent prepares the final EIS, the
agency may determine that substantial change in a project or
new information about adverse environmental impacts
requires the project proponent to prepare a Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement ("SEIS").29 This agency
determination is essentially a new threshold determination,
but involves essentially the same process as the EIS.s0
III. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. SEPA Standards of Judicial Review
SEPA, as originally enacted in 1971, contained no stan-
dards of judicial review.3 1 In 1973, however, the Washington
State Legislature amended SEPA to limit judicial scrutiny of
SEPA compliance by directing courts to accord "substantial
weight" to agency threshold decisions and EIS adequacy deter-
minations.3 2 In 1983, the legislature reaffirmed this deference
by amending SEPA to require that the court accord substantial
deference to SEPA rules in the interpretation of SEPA.3 3 The
legislative history of the 1983 amendment to SEPA indicates
that the legislature adopted this second amendment because it
was concerned about whether the courts adequately reviewed
and considered the state SEPA administrative rules before
interpreting SEPA.' To remedy this concern, the legislature
determined that it was "extremely important that the courts
should first turn to the administrative rules to see if they
interpret a provision involved and should give substantial
29. Id §§ 197-11-405(4), -600(4)(d).
30. Id. §§ 197-11-405(4), -600(4)(d), - 620.
31. SETTLE, supra note 6, at 4-4.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.090 (1989). The full text of the 1973 amendment is
as follows:
In any action involving an attack on a determination by a governmental
agency relative to the requirement or the absence of the requirement, or the
adequacy of a "detailed statement," the decision of the governmental agency
shall be accorded substantial weight.
Id., 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 179, § 3.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.095 (1989) states as follows: "The rules
promulgated under RCW 43.21C.110 shall be accorded substantial deference in the
interpretation of this chapter." Id.
34. Kenneth S. Weiner, SEPA and Recent Legislative Amendments (S.SB. 3006),
in THE FIRST ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW SECTION MID-YEAR MEETING AND
SEMINARS 192 (Washington State Bar Ass'n ed., May, 1983) (on file with the
University of Puget Sound Law Review). Kenneth S. Weiner, partner in the Seattle
law firm of Preston Thorgrimson Shidler Gates & Ellis, was special counsel to the
Commission on Environmental Policy.
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weight to such interpretation."3
B. Case Law Standards of Judicial Review
An agency decision not to require a project proponent to
prepare a SEIS always involves an underlying EIS. Therefore,
on appeal, the reviewing court could consider both the ade-
quacy of the underlying EIS and the negative threshold deter-
mination in evaluating the agency decision. The correctness of
threshold determinations36 and the adequacy of impact state-
ments37 are the two most frequently litigated issues under
SEPA; however, these issues are subject to different standards
of judicial review.38
Although the court reviews EIS adequacy under a de novo
standard,39 generally negative threshold determinations are
reviewed under either the arbitrary or capricious, or clearly
erroneous standard.4 ° The de novo standard of review is, by
35. Id.
36. The following cases involved decisions about whether or not the threshold
determination was correct: ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685,
601 P.2d 501 (1979); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977);
Marino Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wash. 2d 822, 567 P.2d 1125 (1977); Swift v.
Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Byers v. Bd. of Clallam County
Comm'rs, 84 Wash. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City
of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974), overruled by Norway Hill
Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674
(1976); West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 770 P.2d 1065, review
denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989); San Juan County v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 28
Wash. App. 796, 626 P.2d 995, review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1029 (1981); Brown v. City of
Tacoma, 30 Wash. App. 762, 637 P.2d 1005 (1981); D.E.B.T., Ltd. v. Bd. of Clallam
County Comm'rs, 24 Wash. App. 136, 600 P.2d 628 (1979); Newaukum Hill Protective
Ass'n v. Lewis County, 19 Wash. App. 162, 574 P.2d 1195 (1978); Richland Homeowner's
Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wash. App. 405, 568 P.2d 818 (1977).
37. The following cases involved EIS adequacy determinations: Citizens for Clean
Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 785 P.2d 447 (1990); In re Northwest Pasco
Annexation, 100 Wash. 2d 864, 676 P.2d 425 (1984); Barrie v. Kitsap County Boundary
Review Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 232, 643 P.2d 433 (1982); Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview
Community Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash. 2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981); Barrie
v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980); Cheney v. City of Mountlake
Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976); Leschi Improvement Council v.
Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974); West 514,
Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 770 P.2d 1065, review denied, 113 Wash.
2d 1005 (1989); SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards, 49 Wash. App. 609, 744 P.2d 1101
(1987); Toandos Peninsula Ass'n v. Jefferson County, 32 Wash. App. 473, 648 P.2d 448
(1982); Mentor v. Kitsap County, 22 Wash. App. 285, 588 P.2d 1226 (1978); Ullock v.
City of Bremerton, 17 Wash. App. 573, 565 P.2d 1179, review denied, 89 Wash. 2d 1011
(1989); Frye Investment Co. v. City of Seattle, 14 Wash. App. 702, 544 P.2d 125 (1976).
38. Rogers, supra note 14, at 35, 50.
39. Leschi Improvement Council, 84 Wash. 2d at 284-85, 525 P.2d at 784.
40. Since 1976, the court has consistently applied the clearly erroneous standard of
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definition, the most intrusive review and accords the least def-
erence to the agency. The arbitrary or capricious standard is
the least intrusive review and accords the most deference to
the agency. The clearly erroneous standard falls somewhere
between the de novo and the arbitrary or capricious standards.
In practice, however, the courts scrutinize EIS threshold deter-
minations more closely than they examine EIS adequacy.4
Because the agency decision not to require a SEIS could be
reviewed under either of three standards and because each
standard allows different degrees of judicial scrutiny, it is
important to understand why these various standards have
been employed by the courts and what components of each are
proper in reviewing a negative threshold SEIS decision.
Accordingly, this portion of the Article will examine current
standards of review for adequacy and negative threshold
determinations.
1. EIS Adequacy: The De Novo Standard of Judicial Review
In Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State High-
way Commission,42 the Washington Supreme Court set forth
the rule that EIS adequacy is subject to de novo review.43 De
novo review is defined as a new, full consideration of the case
in which the court is entitled to form its own independent con-
clusions from the record.44 By definition, this standard of
review ignores the statutory directive that courts accord the
review to negative threshold determinations. See Norway Hill Preservation &
Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976).
See also Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash. 2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977); Swift v. Island
County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976). Prior to the Norway Hill decision, the
court employed the arbitrary or capricious standard of review. See Narrowsview
Preservation Ass'n, 84 Wash. 2d at 423, 526 P.2d at 902.
41. SETTLE, supra note 6, at 161.
42. 84 Wash. 2d 271, 284-85, 525 P.2d 774, 784 (1974).
43. In Leschi, the court first set forth a functional test to decide whether the issue
on review involved (1) findings of fact, (2) application of law to facts, or
(3) determinations of law.
"A finding of fact is the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or will be
happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." Id. at 283,
525 P.2d at 783. After defining the test, the court stated that an agency finding of EIS
adequacy is not an assertion independent of legal effect because it "necessarily
determines the legal rights of the parties as to the disputed project." Id. at 285, 525
P.2d at 784.
Because "legal rights" were involved, the court determined that EIS adequacy was
an application of law to facts and was equivalent to a determination of law, entitled to
de novo review. Id. at 282-85, 525 P.2d at 783-84.
44. Reagan v. Bd. of Directors, 4 Wash. App. 279, 287, 480 P.2d 807, 811 (1971).
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agency decision substantial weight 45 because the court can sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the agency.
Despite the lack of deference required by the de novo
standard, courts do constrain the intrusiveness of their review
by relying on the "rule of reason" to judge the adequacy of
environmental documents.46 Under the rule of reason, agen-
cies are not required to review "every remote and speculative
consequences of an action."47 The rule of reason dictates that
there be more than a reasonable probability that the proposed
action will have more than a moderate effect on the environ-
ment before an EIS must issue.48
A recent supreme court opinion clarified that while de
novo is the appropriate standard of review for EIS adequacy,
the court will give the agency's decision "substantial weight"
and will apply the "rule of reason. '49 Whether the court will
apply the substantial weight and reasonableness standard sepa-
rately or as an element of the de novo standard is unclear from
the opinion. However, requiring the court to accord substan-
tial weight to the agency decision and requiring a rule of rea-
son analysis narrows the broad de novo standard of review by
constraining the court's ability to form an independent conclu-
sion from the evidence.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.090 (1989) requires that the court accord substantial
weight to the agency decision.
46. Cheney v. Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 552 P.2d 184, 188-89 (1976);
SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards, 49 Wash. App. 609, 614, 744 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1987);
Mentor v. Kitsap County, 22 Wash. App. 285, 289, 588 P.2d 1226, 1229 (1978).
47. Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d at 344, 552 P.2d at 189.
48. Murden Cove v. Kitsap County, 41 Wash. App. 515, 704 P.2d 1242 (1985). The
court held as follows:
An examination of the entire record does not lead to the conclusion that a
mistake was committed. Assuming, arguendo, that the approval is a "major
action," it cannot be said that a reasonable probability exists that the
governmental action will have a more than moderate effect on the
surrounding environment considering the subject property's location and the
approved uses permitted under the UPUP granted to the entire tract of land.
Id. at 525, 704 P.2d at 1249.
See also Brown v. Tacoma, 30 Wash. App. 762, 637 P.2d 1005 (1981), in which the
court held as follows:
An environmental impact statement is required for "major actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the environment." (RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c)).
Action "significantly" affects the environment "'whenever more than a mod-
erate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probability.'"
Id. at 768, 637 P.2d at 1008.
49. Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 33-34, 785 P.2d 447,
455 (1990).
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2. Negative Threshold Determinations: The Arbitrary or
Capricious and Clearly Erroneous Standards of
Review
The court has reviewed negative threshold determinations
under two different standards: the arbitrary or capricious stan-
dard and the clearly erroneous standard. Initially, the court
utilized the arbitrary or capricious standard to review an
agency's negative threshold determination.-° This standard has
been defined as "willful and unreasonable action, without con-
sideration and [in] disregard of facts or circumstances. Where
there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration
though it may be felt that a different conclusion might have
been reached.
51
Subsequently, in Norway Hill Preservation and Protection
Association v. King County Council,5 2 the court rejected the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review and held that the
broader "clearly erroneous" standard was the proper standard
of review for a negative threshold determination. Since Nor-
way Hill, the court has consistently applied the clearly errone-
ous standard when reviewing negative threshold
determinations.5 3
Under the clearly erroneous standard, the court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body.' 4
"A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
50. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 423, 526
P.2d 897, 902 (1974), overruled by Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King
County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). The court actually stated the
standard as "arbitrary and capricious," rather than the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. Compare Narrowsview
Preservation, 84 Wash. 2d at 423, 526 P.2d at 902 with WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.05.570(3)(i) (1989).
51. Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 850, 613 P.2d 1148, 1152-53 (1980)
(citing Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Bishop v. Houghton,
69 Wash. 2d 786, 420 P.2d 368 (1966)).
52. 87 Wash. 2d 267, 274-75, 552 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1976).
53. SETTLE, supra note 6, at 115; Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of DuPont, 103
Wash. 2d 720, 725-26, 696 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1985); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90
Wash. 2d 59, 69, 578 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1978); Murden Cove Preservation Ass'n v. Kitsap
County, 41 Wash. App. 515, 523, 704 P.2d 1242, 1247-48 (1985).
54. Victoria Partnership v. Seattle, 59 Wash. App. 592, 800 P.2d 380 (1990)
(articulating clearly erroneous standard in context of review of substantive decisions
based on SEPA), review denied, 116 Wash. 2d 1012 (1991).
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been committed.15 5
The Norway Hill court indicated that the clearly errone-
ous standard encompasses the legislative mandate for courts to
accord substantial weight to the agency decision." Moreover,
the Washington Court of Appeals has recently emphasized the
substantial weight component of the clearly erroneous stan-
dard.57 The court said that when reviewing negative threshold
determinations, it recognizes and defers to the agency's
expertise.5
C. Summary of Current Case Law Standards of Review
As case law now stands, adequacy of an EIS is reviewed
under a broad de novo standard that, by definition, allows the
court to form an independent judgment from the evidence.
The de novo review, however, is not unlimited because the
agency decision must be accorded substantial weight, and the
adequacy of the environmental documents must be judged by
the rule of reason. In comparison, negative threshold determi-
nations are reviewed under the more narrow clearly erroneous
standard that allows reversal of the agency action only when
the court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been commit-
ted. The clearly erroneous review is additionally constrained
by the requirement that the agency decision be accorded sub-
stantial weight.
The primary difference between the two standards is that,
under the de novo standard of review, the court may substitute
its judgment for that of the agency regardless of whether it is
firmly convinced that a mistake has been committed. Because
SEIS review could apply different standards to review EIS ade-
quacy and negative threshold determinations, the results of lit-
igation become unpredictable unless one standard of judicial
review is clearly set forth.
55. Murden Cove, 41 Wash. App. at 523, 704 P.2d at 1247-48.
56. Norway Hill, 87 Wash. 2d at 275, 552 P.2d at 679.
57. West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 844, 770 P.2d 1065,
1068, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
58. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing Nisqually Delta Ass'n
v. DuPont, 103 Wash. 2d 720, 725-26, 696 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1985)); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.090 (1989).
Accord Murden Cove, 41 Wash. App. at 524, 704 P.2d at 1248; Hayden v. Port
Townsend, 93 Wash. 2d 870, 880, 613 P.2d 1164, 1170 (1980), overruled on other grounds
by Save A Neighborhood Env't v. City of Seattle, 101 Wash. 2d 280, 286 n.1, 676 P.2d
1006, 1010 n.1 (1984).
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D. NEPA Standards of Judicial Review
SEPA's language encompasses major portions of its federal
counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act 9
(NEPA).6 °  Under SEPA and NEPA, similar procedural
requirements are set forth to require preparation of a detailed
EIS for most major actions that significantly affect the envi-
ronment." NEPA, however, is essentially a procedural statute,
and judicial review is limited to determining whether agencies
have conformed with NEPA's procedural requirements.2
SEPA, on the other hand, contains a strong substantive policy
declaration that "each person has a fundamental and inaliena-
ble right to a healthful environment."'
Despite the stronger policy directive of SEPA, Washington
courts typically follow leading federal cases interpreting NEPA
when construing similar provisions of SEPA.64 Because Wash-
ington courts will, where applicable, follow NEPA case law,
understanding the NEPA judicial standards of review may be
helpful in developing the appropriate SEPA standard of judi-
cial review for an agency decision not to require preparation of
a SEIS.
Several Courts of Appeals, including that of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, have adopted a "reasonableness" standard of review and
have held that an agency's decision not to supplement an EIS
will be upheld in light of new information if the decision is
reasonable.' As part of this reasonableness standard, federal
courts have required that agencies take a "hard look" at the
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
60. Rogers, supra note 14, at 34.
61. Peter Eglick & Henryk Hiller, The Myth of Mitigation Under NEPA and
SEPA, 20 ENVTL. L. 773, 774 (1990).
62. Id. at 775. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333
(1989); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) (1989).
64. Barrie v. Boundary Review Bd., 97 Wash. 2d 232, 235, 643 P.2d 433, 435 (1982);
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Ass'n, 82 Wash. 2d 475, 488, 513 P.2d 36, 45
(1973). See also West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 845, 770 P.2d
1065, 1069 (relying on federal cases construing "significant new information" under
NEPA to determine what constitutes significant new information under SEPA),
review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
65. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1987); Enos v.
Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767,
782 (9th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 747 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. Watt,
716 F.2d 946, 948 (1st Cir. 1983); Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d
1083, 1087-88 (8th Cir. 1979).
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environmental aspects of the project in light of new informa-
tion.66 While a "hard look" must be taken based on new infor-
mation that comes to light regarding a project, no blind
obligation exists to supplement an EIS merely because new
information develops.67
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that a decision not
to supplement an EIS should be reviewed under the narrow
arbitrary or capricious standard set forth in the Administrative
Procedures Act.68  The court held that the agency's decision
was entitled to deference because the question presented for
review was a factual dispute requiring the agency's expertise
69
and deference to "the informed discretion of the responsible
federal agencies. "70 Under the arbitrary or capricious stan-
dard, the reviewing court "must consider whether the decision
66. Nat'l Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649 (D.N.M. 1980), qff'd,
664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981).
An important difference between an agency's decision to file an initial EIS and its
decision to supplement an EIS is that the decision to supplement is made in light of an
already existing, in-depth review of the likely environmental consequences of the
proposed action. Thus, it seems clear that the principal factor that an agency should
consider in exercising its discretion to supplement an existing EIS because of new
information is the extent to which the new information presents a picture of the likely
environmental consequences associated with the proposed action not envisioned by the
original EIS. As one court has stated, "It]here is no benefit in taking another 'hard
look' at an action if that view is taken from the same vantage point and overlooks the
same environmental panorama." Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir.
1984).
67. "When new information comes to light, the agency must consider it, and make
a reasoned determination whether it is of such significance to require implementation
of NEPA filing requirements." Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d
1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1987). Accord Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1980): "This does not mean, however, that supplementation is required
whenever new information becomes available." Id. at 1024. "[C]ongress intended that
the 'hard look' be incorporated as part of the agency's process of deciding whether to
pursue a particular federal action." Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 100 (1983).
68. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1989).
69. Id. at 376-77. In determining that the issue was a factual dispute, the court
noted the following:
Respondents' claim that the Corps' decision not to file a second supplemental
EIS should be set aside primarily rests on the contention that the new
information undermines conclusions contained in the FEIS, that the
conclusions contained in the ODFW memorandum and the SCS survey are
accurate, and that the Corps' expert review of the new information was
incomplete, inconclusive, or inaccurate. The dispute thus does not turn on the
meaning of the term "significant" or on an application of this legal standard to
settled facts. Rather, resolution of this dispute involves primarily issues of
fact.
Id.
70. Id. at 377 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 380, 412 (1976)).
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was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
71
The Court recognized that several Courts of Appeals had
adopted the "reasonableness" standard (including the Ninth
Circuit) but found that the differences between the standards
was not of great consequence.72 The Court stated that its deci-
sion would not require a substantial reworking of long-estab-
lished NEPA law.73
The NEPA standard of judicial review encompasses por-
tions of the SEPA standard of review because reasonableness
plays an important role under both SEPA and NEPA review.
Because of the stronger policy directives of SEPA, courts
reviewing SEPA agency determinations will not likely adopt
the arbitrary or capricious standard of review. Instead, courts
will probably look toward the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on
"reasonableness" as strong evidence that SEPA judicial review
should continue to incorporate reasonableness into the review
process.
IV. THE NECESSITY FOR A PROPOSED NEW STANDARD OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In assessing and determining a standard of judicial review
for agency decisions not to require a SEIS, a core issue is to
what extent the court must defer to the agency decision. In
ordinary administrative law, this concept of deference is com-
plex.74 Under SEPA, however, deference is a less complicated
matter because statutory language requires the court to give
deference to the agency's decision.75
The legislature, by two separate amendments ten years
apart, has mandated that the agency determination must be
accorded substantial weight.7" It is significant that these were
amendments to SEPA, the first occurring approximately two
years after SEPA had been enacted. Because the legislature
71. Id. at 378 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971)).
72. Id. at 377 n.23.
73. Id.
74. Tim J. Filer, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in
Washington Revisited - Doctrine, Analysis, and Proposed Revisions, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 653 (1985); Harlan S. Abrahams, Scope of Review of Administrative Action in
Washington: A Proposal, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 75 (1978).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.090 (1989).
76. Id. §§ 43.21C.090, -.21(C).095.
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had time to see how courts were interpreting SEPA and then
imposed the substantial weight requirement upon the courts,
an argument can be made that the legislative intent was to set
some limit on judicial discretion to interpret SEPA.
SEPA is a complex set of specific rules, drafted and
revised over almost twenty years. Within this intricate set of
rules, if the legislature had intended to give the courts unlim-
ited judicial scrutiny for EIS adequacy determinations, such as
de novo review, it could have mandated that the court take a
new look at all of the evidence and make its own independent
conclusions from the evidence. The legislature has not done
this. Significantly, the SEPA amendments require the court to
accord the agency decision substantial weight. This legislative
mandate is strong evidence of the legislature's intent to guard
against overly intrusive judicial scrutiny.
Safeguards against agency abuse of discretion are inherent
within the structure of SEPA. First, the court is required only
to accord substantial weight to the agency decision.77 This is
not total deference but a weighted deference in favor of the
agency determination. Second, the agency decision is made by
a responsible official"8 of the lead agency. Third, the lead
agency must make the draft EIS available to the public and
must send copies to the Department of Ecology and other
agencies with jurisdiction. 9 Fourth, the consulted agencies
have a period of time within which to comment and/or object
to the draft EIS. Fifth, public hearings regarding the draft EIS
are required if requested within thirty days of issuance by fifty
or more people who either reside within the lead agency's
jurisdiction or are adversely affected by the proposal's environ-
mental impact.8 0
Critics of the substantial weight requirement argue that
SEPA agencies are not experts and that, therefore, agency
decisions should not be accorded substantial weight."' These
critics argue that judges are experts who are best suited to bal-
77. Id. § 43.21C.090.
78. WASH ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-788 (1990).
79. Id. § 197-11-455. Agencies with jurisdiction are those agencies with special
expertise on the environmental impacts in a proposal or alternative proposal
significantly affecting the environment. Id. § 197-11-714(2).
80. Id. § 197-11-535(2). Public hearings are also required when requested by two
agencies who have jurisdiction over the proposal. Id.
81. Michael W. Elsass, Note, A Standard for Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisionmaking Under SEPA-Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 54 WASH. L. REV. 693,
703-04 (1979).
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ance economic, social, and policy interests.S2 This argument
overlooks the fact that the lead agency's decision is made by a
responsible official after all agencies with jurisdiction are con-
sulted and after a period of time for comment has passed. The
consulted agencies possess expertise in relevant environmental
matters that concern the project.83 Accordingly, lead agencies,
through the responsible official and the other agencies with
jurisdiction, may be viewed as experts in the implementation
of the Act, and therefore, their decision should be accorded
substantial weight.8 4
Judges, on the other hand, are not experts in environmen-
tal law. They lack the institutional competence to adequately
review every phase of the agency's decision. While judges may
be experts at policy formulation, SEPA already contains a spe-
cific, detailed policy mandate.S5 Accordingly, judges are not
required to formulate policy while undertaking SEPA review.
What is required on review is that judges defer to the agency's
institutional competence and accord the agency determination
substantial weight.8 6
Even under a de novo standard of review, the Washington
Supreme Court has recognized that courts must accord the
agency decision substantial weight and apply the rule of rea-
son." By incorporating the substantial weight and rule of rea-
son requirements into the de novo standard, the court makes
much less than an independent conclusion on the evidence.
Accordingly, the label "de novo" is an improper characteriza-
tion of the court's review of EIS adequacy.
In Washington, the clearly erroneous standard is the cur-
rent standard of review for negative threshold determina-
tions.8 ' A finding is'clearly erroneous when evidence supports
it, but the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake
82. Id. at 704.
83. For example, the Department of Health and the Department of Ecology are
agencies with expertise in matters pertaining to water quality standards. See, e.g.,
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-282-0920, 173-201-101 (1990).
84. But see Elsass, supra note 81, at 703-04 (contending that agencies have limited
expertise and, that, accordingly, the court should exercise broad review under SEPA).
85. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010 -.21(C).020 (1989).
86. Id. §§ 43.21C.090, -21(C).095.
87. Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 34, 785 P.2d 447, 455
(1990).
88. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87
Wash. 2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674, 679 (1976).
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has been made. 9 Washington courts have recognized that they
must accord the agency determination substantial weight when
reviewing negative threshold determinations. 9
When construing NEPA, the Ninth Circuit utilizes a "rea-
sonableness" standard on negative threshold review. An
agency decision will not be overturned so long as it is "reason-
able."91 Reasonableness is an important component of negative
threshold review because it adds an additional safeguard
against agency abuse of SEPA by allowing the court to engage
in a flexible balancing test.
Accordingly, to avoid fortuitous results in the judicial
review process and to conform the review standard to statutory
law, case law, and directives, judicial review of agency deci-
sions not to require supplementation of an EIS should be as
follows. The court should employ the clearly erroneous stan-
dard after first reasonably examining the adequacy of environ-
mental documents and according the agency determination and
the applicable SEPA rules substantial weight. Thus, the
court's analysis should be a two-step process. First, the court
should reasonably examine the adequacy of environmental
documents in light of new information and should accord the
agency determination substantial weight. Then, if the court is
firmly convinced that a mistake has been committed, the
agency decision should be overturned.
V. WEST 514, INC. V. COUNTY OF SPOKANE: APPLICATION OF
THE NEW STANDARD
In a recent case, West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane,9 2 an
agency decision not to require preparation of an SEIS was
affirmed. The appellate court affirmed a decision of the Spo-
kane County Board of County Commissioners ("Board")
approving a site development plan for a proposed retail shop-
ping mall.
In evaluating the effect of the mall on the environment,
the Board did not require a SEIS but instead adopted a prior
89. West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 844, 770 P.2d 1065,
1068, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
90. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069.
91. Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985).
92. 53 Wash. App. 838, 770 P.2d 1065, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
West 514 has recently been cited with approval in Pease Hill Community Group v.
County of Spokane, 62 Wash. App. 800, 809, 816 P.2d 37, 42 (1991) (affirming the use of
a MDNS and not requiring the preparation of an SEIS).
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EIS prepared for a different project on the same site and
upheld the issuance of a Mitigated Determination of Non-Sig-
nificance ("MDNS") by the Spokane County Hearing Exam-
iner Committee.93 The primary issue before the court of
appeals was whether the Board should have required a SEIS. 4
West 514 is relevant to this Comment because the case
involved an underlying EIS and agency decision not to require
preparation of an SEIS, enabling observation of the new stan-
dard of review.95
A. Significant Facts
In 1978, an EIS was completed for a mixed use develop-
ment proposal that was never constructed on the property
involved in the suit. 6 However, in 1986, a new site develop-
ment plan was submitted for approval. The proposed plan was
for a ninety-seven acre regional shopping mall on a portion of
the acreage previously zoned for office/industrial/shopping
center use.97 The mall was a permitted use under the 1981
93. The case involved both an EIS and an MDNS because the EIS was adopted
from a different project on the same site. The MDNS was issued in connection with
the defendant's project.
94. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-600 (1990) (promulgated pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 43.21C (1989) (SEPA)) provides:
(4) Existing documents may be used for a proposal by employing one or more
of the following methods: . ..
(d) Preparation of a SEIS [supplemental EIS] if there are
(i) Substantial changes so that the proposal is likely to have significant
adverse environmental impacts; or
(ii) New information indicating a proposal's probable significant adverse
environmental impacts.
95. While Norway Hill set forth the rule that negative threshold determinations
were reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, Norway Hill did not involve an
underlying EIS. Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County
Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674, 679 (1976).
96. Stanley R. Schultz, SEPA Omnibus, Using Existing Environmental
Documents and Handling Economic Impact Issues: The Effect of the West 514 Case, in
ENVIRONMENTAL & LAND USE SECTION MIDYEAR MEETING & SEMINAR ch. 1
(Washington State Bar Ass'n ed., 1990) (on file with University of Puget Sound Law
Review).
The proposed development involved 800 acres and included plans for a 700 acre
residential development, a 29 acre community shopping center with a building area of
128,000 square feet, a 20 acre office park, and an 80 acre business park. West 514, Inc.
v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 840, 770 P.2d 1065, 1066, review denied, 113
Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
97. The plans included widening Liberty Lake Road, constructing a new four-lane
road along the southern perimeter of the property, and improving two road
interchanges. Id.
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zoning regulations. The 1978 EIS evaluated a smaller shopping
center and a business and office park.
In evaluating the mall project, the Planning Department
of Spokane County ("Planning Department") identified four
potential areas of concern: (1) traffic circulation, (2) air qual-
ity, (3) floodwater runoff, and (4) possible flooding in a 100-
year flood.98 The Planning Department adopted a MDNS and
required the mall proponent to submit detailed information on
these four areas. 99
The applicant, Liberty Lake Investments, 1°° prepared a
revised traffic study, conducted additional air quality monitor-
ing, and submitted drainage and runoff plans. These docu-
ments were circulated to the agencies responsible for
regulating their respective areas of the environment. 101 The
Planning Department concluded that the MDNS could be
issued with the available information and augmented with
some "fine tuning," which was to be provided.1"2 The MDNS
was mailed to twenty-two agencies with jurisdiction.10 3 Notice
of the hearing before the Spokane County Hearing Examiner
was mailed to 113 other private and public groups and
agencies.1° 4
On December 23, 1986, the Planning Department, in con-
98. Memorandum of Respondent Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. in Support of
Decision to Approve at 3, West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane (Wash. Super. Court,
Spokane County 1987) (No. 87-2-01106-7) [hereinafter Respondent's Trial Brief] (citing
Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at 26).
99. Id.
100. The project proponent and applicant, Liberty Lake Investments, Inc., was a
defendant/respondent in this action. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at 27).
103. These 22 agencies included inter alia the Department of Ecology in Spokane
and Olympia, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Spokane County
Health District, the City of Spokane, the City Planning Department, all appropriate
water districts, the Department of Natural Resources, the Spokane County Air
Pollution Control Authority, and the Washington State Department of Transportation.
Id. Thereafter, each agency comment recommending a mitigating measure was made a
condition of approval. Id. at 3 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at
28).
Consulted agencies have a responsibility to respond in a timely and specific
manner to requests for comments. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-502(2) (1990). If a
consulted agency does not respond with written comments, the lead agency may
assume that the consulted agency has no information relating to the potential impact
of the proposal as it relates to the consulted agency's jurisdiction or special expertise.
Id. § 197-11-545(1).
104. Respondent's Trial Brief at 3 (citing Spokane County Commissioners'
Transcript at 29).
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sidering the mall project, adopted both the EIS prepared in
1978 for the original project and also entered a MDNS.0 5 At a
public hearing on January 8, 1987, the Spokane County Hear-
ing Examiner affirmed the Planning Department's decision
and approved the site development planoe. No agencies or pri-
vate citizens appeared in opposition before the Hearing Exam-
iner. West 514 appealed the Hearing Examiner Decision to the
Spokane County Board of Commissioners, which held a de
novo hearing on February 19, 1987.107
At the hearing, West 514 presented the testimony of Larry
Esvelt, an environmental engineer, concerning his opinion of
the impact of the proposed mall on water quality. He testified
that although the 1978 EIS acknowledged that a closed landfill
located immediately southwest of the project was a "potential
aquifer water quality factor," the landfill had been placed on
the National Priorities List of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(Superfund).'0 8
Dr. Esvelt expressed two concerns. First, "the injection of
water at this site is going to increase . . . the water flow
through the area we know is already contaminated by the
Greenacres Landfill."'" Second "this project could affect ...
methods for cleanup [of the landfill] and we don't know what
105. West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 840, 770 P.2d 1065,
1066, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989). The MDNS stated as follows:
The lead agency [Spokane County Planning Department] for this proposal has
determined that it does not have a probable significant adverse impact on the
environment if mitigated as stipulated below. An Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) is not required under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). This decision
was made after review of a completed environmental checklist and other
information on file with the lead agency .... There are four areas of concern
in the development of the Liberty Lake site...
(1) A background and continued air quality monitoring program ....
(2) A detailed traffic and circulation plan ....
(3) A drainage plan dealing with "208" design concepts on-site and off-site
drainage disposal for flood waters as identified by the 100-year Flood Hazard
Area .... ["208" refers to the report of the Spokane County Water Quality
Management Program on its investigation of the Spokane-Rathdrum Prairie
Aquifer.]
(4) Development in substantial conformance with the submitted site plan
except as may be modified by the above studies ....
Id. at 840-41, 770 P.2d at 1066-67.
106. Id. at 841, 770 P.2d at 1067.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 841-42, 770 P.2d at 1067. Dr. Esvelt was referring to the Jeffers well, a
water source downgradient from the landfill, that had been identified as containing
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they're going to be, but it could impact them by spreading the
contaminant beyond where they are now... ."110 Although he
discussed the location of the Greenacres Landfill, he did not
testify that those public water supply systems were contami-
nated or would ever be contaminated in the future.11'
leachate (liquid that percolates through soil or other medium) from the landfill. Id. at
842, 770 P.2d at 1067.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Respondent's Trial Brief at 28.
At the hearing, Commissioner McBride asked Dr. Esvelt whether he was saying
that, if the groundwater was allowed to percolate, it could possibly pick up chemicals
from the landfill " ... and pull it into the aquifer." Esvelt responded:
Well, no, I was not attempting to imply that. I was implying, though, that
increasing the water injection here. There's, there's two impacts: One, the
contaminates in the urban runoff itself from this site, which are going to be
considerably greater than in a housing development or something like that,
need to be considered because this is going to be a high-use site. Secondly that
the injection of the water at this site is going to increase perhaps or it appears
from the mitigating alternatives that I see, increase the water flow into
groundwater through the area we know is already contaminated by the
Greenacres Landfill.
Respondent's Trial Brief at 29 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at
61).
When pressed further, Esvelt testified:
I don't know that it's, whether it's an increase, it certainly would not be a
reduction in the amount of water, and what I'm saying is that we really don't
know very much about that Greenacres Landfill and the area of contamina-
tion now and need a lot more information.
Respondent's Trial Brief at 29 (citing Spokane County Commissioner's Transcript at
61).
When questioned further by Commissioner Mummey, Esvelt admitted that he did
not know if the Greenacres Landfill contamination and the aquifer were "linked."
Commissioner Mummey: Well, Larry, what you are really saying is that this
project is not going to have an impact on the Greenacres Landfill. What
you're saying is, is that the Greenacres Landfill is a potential for contamina-
tion to the aquifer and we don't know all about it yet and we have another 30
years to find out because the life, usually of an old - is probably 50 years, we
think. But what you're saying, and tell me if I'm wrong, is that this, your
thinking that this shopping center will just be an added source of pollution
when you're coupling the two together. That you have one here, and you've
got one here? Is that what you're saying?
Larry Esvelt: One, that the, okay, and let's make them separable, because I
don't know that they're linked. The first is that the Greenacres Landfill is a
source of leachate into the aquifer and this project will not have an impact on
that as I can...
Commissioner Mummey: Yeah, that is what I wanted to have cleared up.
Respondent's Trial Brief at 30 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at
62-63).
Later, Mr. Esvelt equivocated further and testified that:
My feeling is that this project could affect those methods for clean-up and we
don't know what they're going to be, but it could impact them by spreading
the contaminant beyond where they are now, if they're somehow confined,
and we don't know that, we only have only one real sample well that's ever
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In response, Michael Kennedy, consulting engineer to the
mall proponent, testified that the project met the drainage
treatment requirements of Spokane County's Water Quality
Management Plan and that any landfill leachate would not
flow toward the mall. 12
Furthermore, West 514 presented the testimony of an
economist, Greg Easton, who reviewed the experiences of
Tacoma, Everett, Olympia, and Seattle. Mr. Easton concluded
that regional shopping malls had caused a decline in retail
sales in the central business districts of those cities. He admit-
ted, however, that Spokane's downtown area was more viable
than those in the other cities. 1 3 Mr. Easton predicted that the
region could not generate sufficient retail dollars to support
the new mall and the existing retail shopping sites in the near
future. This raised the issue of whether "economic competi-
tion" must be evaluated by SEPA decision makers. 14
been tested that we know the pollutants are there. And no one has gone and
looked in all places around.
Respondent's Trial Brief at 30 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at
62-63).
Other speakers challenged the ambivalence of Mr. Esvelt's testimony.
(He] didn't say that this project was going to create a groundwater problem.
That it would create one he doesn't even say that it could, other than a very
remote sense that we could all be hit by an airplane while we're sitting here.
He didn't predict that the Greenacres Landfill would create a problem similar
to the Colbert Landfill, and I don't think he would say that. So what he
doesn't say is what's important and he's, he has given you information, all the
information that he can give you. He can't go to the next step and he won't.
Respondent's Trial Brief at 30-31 (citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript at
89-90).
After Mr. Esvelt's testimony was challenged, the appellants did not recall him to
establish clearly the "probable" impact of the project on any public drinking water
supply. Respondent's Trial Brief at 31.
112. West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App. 838, 842, 770 P.2d 1065,
1067, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989).
113. Id.
114. SEPA does not require evaluation of economic competition factors. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-448(3) (1990). Appellants, West 514, contended that the project
would have an adverse, indirect impact on the Spokane Central Business District and
that these "socio-economic" impacts required preparation of an EIS. Appellants relied
primarily on Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980) ("Barrie
II").
The history of Barrie II and the legislative amendment to SEPA following Barrie
II demonstrate that the appellant's arguments lack merit. Barrie II was decided in
1980, and the court's decision relied on the general policy statement contained in
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c)(i)-(ii) (1989). The policy statement indicates the
state's policy to fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of its citizens. The
court also acknowledged that the Washington Administrative Code regulations in
effect in 1980 did not "expressly require a discussion of economic and social effects."
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The Board found that the Greenacres Landfill was ade-
quately discussed in the 1978 EIS, that economic or socioeco-
nomic consequences could not be the basis for requiring an
EIS, and that no new information was sufficient to require a
SEIS.1 15
It is noteworthy that the court's opinion fails to mention
that two of the appellants, far from being citizen participants,
may have been directly associated with a competing shopping
Barrie, 93 Wash. 2d at 859, 613 P.2d at 1157. Accordingly, the court required
environmental documents to evaluate "socio-economic issues." Id. at 861, 613 P.2d at
1158.
Additionally, in response to an argument that socio-economic effects were remote
or speculative, the court stated that "possible" socio-economic impacts might exist and
that those "possible impacts" were not remote or speculative. Id. at 859, 613 P.2d at
1157. Therefore, the court concluded that the county's EIS was inadequate because it
did not discuss "socio-economic effects." Id. at 860, 613 P.2d at 1158.
In arguably a direct response to Barrie II, the legislature amended certain
provisions of SEPA in 1983. See 1983 Wash. Laws ch. 117. Section 1 of Chapter 117
amended WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.031 and specifically provided that an EIS was
required only for projects having a "probable significant adverse environmental
impact" (emphasis added).
In response to the 1983 amendment to SEPA, the Washington Administrative
Code was also amended. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-444 (1990). With these
amendments, the code rejects any requirement to evaluate impacts based on "economic
competition" or "socio-economic impacts." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-448(1)-(3)
(1990).
Barrie IFs holding, therefore, has been substantially eroded by the 1983 legislative
amendments to SEPA and the subsequent amendments to the Washington
Administrative Code. See also SEAPC v. Commack II Orchards, 49 Wash. App. 609,
744 P.2d 1101 (1987), where the court rejected an argument that SEPA requires
evaluation of economic factors. Id. at 613-14, 744 P.2d at 1104. Specifically, the court
held that an environmental analysis was not required to evaluate "socio-economic"
impacts. Id. at 615-16, 744 P.2d at 1105 (quoting WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-448).
Furthermore, the court held that adverse impacts on surrounding property values
were more related to profits, personal income, and wages and that these items were
expressly "exempted" from SEPA. Id. at 616, 744 P.2d 1105-06. See also Concerned
Olympia Residents v. Olympia, 33 Wash. App. 677, 682, 657 P.2d 790, 793 (1983)
(holding that lost profit because of increased competition resulting from construction
of additional hospitals in Olympia was "not even arguably within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by SEPA." But see SErrLE, supra note 6, at 178-79 (arguing that
probable degeneration of a central business district as a socio-economic impact in
Barrie would be included in an EIS because "an 'existing land use plan and
population,' 'aesthetics,' 'historic and cultural preservation,' 'transportation,' and
'public services and utilities' probably would be implicated").
115. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 846-47; 770 P.2d at 1069. The Board's findings may
be more specifically summarized as follows:
1. The Greenacres Landfill was adequately discussed in the 1978 EIS.
With respect to Dr. Esvelt's comments that it is difficult to predict what will
happen at the landfill as a result of its placement on the federal Superfund
toxic waste cleanup list, the Board noted that placement on the list requires
responsible parties to take appropriate action in light of surrounding land
uses, including the proposal. The Board also cited Engineer Kennedy's
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center in the Spokane Valley called "University City Shopping
Center." '1 1 6 The trial court and the court of appeals were
apprised of this in the Respondent's Brief and in oral
argument.
117
B. Issues on Appeal and Standard of Judicial Review
West 514 appealed the Board's decision, assigning error to
the Board's findings.1 1 West 514 contended that (1) the West
testimony that drainage from the landfill will not be affected by the proposed
storm water drainage basin for the project.
2. Economic or socioeconomic consequences of a shopping center cannot
be the basis for the requirement of an EIS.
3. Allegations of toxic substances in storm water runoff and allegations
of the limited success of "208 storm water methods" are not "new
information" under WAC § 179-11-600 so as to require a supplemental SEIS.
The new project is subject to 208 water quality management provisions which
requires more stringent standards than the 1978 project.
4. The impacts due to road construction and air quality are less than
those predicted in the prior EIS. The condition of approval requiring air
quality monitoring and modeling is a mitigating condition which when met
will confirm that the project will not have a significant adverse environmental
impact.
West 514 at 844-49, 770 P.2d at 1069-71.
116. Brief of Respondent at 4, West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane, 53 Wash. App.
838, 770 P.2d 1065 (1980) (No. 9314-0-I1) [hereinafter Respondent's Appellate Brief]
(citing Spokane County Commissioners' Transcript, at 87).
Respondent Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. contended that appellants Antone and
Sundena Plese were part owners of University City, Inc., a competing shopping center
also located in the Spokane Valley.
117. In his argument, counsel for respondent, Liberty Lake, stated:
[I] simply think the court has to look at who are those that are crying for this
environmental protection, and who are here before this court today. It isn't
the group of citizens that are back here, that have taken the time to come to
see you; it is two people that have a vested interest in this project and who
have an ownership in a competitor.
And I think that is a factor that the court must consider in evaluating this cry
for the environmental protection that is being made by the appellants here
today. I think that they stand alone . . .They are alone in their cries for
environmental protection.
Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings at 75-76, West 514, Inc. v. County of Spokane
(Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County 1988) (No. 87-2-01106-7) (Oral Argument of Jerry
R. Neal).
While the appellants consistently characterized themselves as citizen participants,
"[iut stretches the imagination to contend that a competitor falls under the rubric of a
citizen participant." Respondent's Appellate Brief at 4.
Critics of the West 514 opinion may not be aware that two of the appellants may
have been competitors rather than citizen participants. Arguably, competitors must be
viewed somewhat differently from citizen participants because competitors may not be
concerned merely with their fundamental right to a healthful environment.
118. Respondents raised the issue of West 514's standing in an order to show cause
hearing in the Superior Court of Spokane County. The court found that West 514 had
standing under SEPA based on West 514's allegations contained in affidavits submitted
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514 expert testimony constituted "new information indicating a
proposal's probable significant adverse environmental
impacts;"' 19 (2) the expanded project was a "significant change
so that the proposal is likely to have significant environmental
impacts;"' 2 ° and (3) the Planning Department erred in issuing
the MDNS.' 2
In upholding the Board's decision, the appellate court
reviewed the decision under the clearly erroneous standard,
22
stating that "agency action may be reversed when the review-
ing court is firmly convinced in light of the record and the pub-
lic policy contained in RCW 43.21C.010 that a mistake has been
committed.' 1 23 Additionally, the court stated that "[i]n such
reviews the court recognizes and defers to the expertise of the
administrative agency. ' '1 2  As discussed below, the court also
implicitly applied a reasonableness standard in evaluating the
new information in light of the underlying EIS already in
place.
C Application of the Standard to the Facts
West 514 contended that Mr. Esvelt's testimony about the
impact of the project on water quality constituted "new infor-
mation" under Wash. Admin. Code § 197-11-600. As such, West
514 asserted that a SEIS was required.
125
for the standing hearing only that run-off from the development would contaminate
the aquifer. These affidavits did not become part of the record. West 514, Inc. v.
County of Spokane, No. 87-2-01106-7, slip. op. (Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County June
3, 1987).
119. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-16-600(4)(d)(ii) (1990).
120. Id. § 197-11-600(4)(d)(i).
121. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 844, 770 P.2d at 1068.
122. Id. (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash. 2d 685, 700, 601
P.2d 501, 512 (1979) and Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County
Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976)).
123. Id. at 845-46, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. DuPont, 103
Wash. 2d 720, 725-26, 696 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1985) and ASARCO, 92 Wash. 2d at 700, 601
P.2d at 512). The court noted that WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010 states:
The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to declare a state policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; (2) to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere; (3) and stimulate the health and welfare
of man; and (4) to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the state and nation.
West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 844 n.4, 770 P.2d at 1068 n.4 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.21C.010).
124. Id. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing Nisqually Delta Ass'n, 103 Wash. 2d at 725-
26, 696 P.2d at 1225).
125. Id. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069.
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In analyzing the issue, the court correctly accorded sub-
stantial deference to SEPA administrative rule, Wash. Admin.
Code § 197-11-600(4)(d)(ii), which states that a SEIS should be
prepared if there is "[n]ew information indicating a proposal's
probable significant adverse environmental impacts."' 26 The
court noted that while "probable" is used to distinguish likely
impacts from those that are remote or speculative, it "is not
meant as a strict statistical probability test. 1 2 7 The court
stated that "[a]n impact may be significant if its chance of
occurrence is not great, but the resulting environmental
impact would be severe if it occurred."' 28
Additionally, the court noted that the passage of time
alone is not "significant new information" and that the lead
agency must determine whether the new information is signifi-
cant.12 9 The court reasoned as follows:
Any project... will, undoubtedly, generate "information" as
it progresses .... [I]n order for "new circumstances or
information" to attain the status of "significant," these must
reach that level where, reasonably, it becomes necessary to
focus attention once more upon the environmental aspects of
a project .... An otherwise unguarded reading of this sub-
part could unleash a procedural plague .... 
1 3o
The court required that the underlying environmental docu-
ments be reasonably examined, thus incorporating a "reasona-
bleness" component into the standard of review. Rather than
requiring supplementation for any new information, the court
instead required supplementation only when the new informa-
tion became "significant" after a reasonable determination.
The court's analysis is consistent with the tendency of Wash-
ington courts to adopt a rule of reason when reviewing the ade-
quacy of environmental documents.
131
126. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-600(4)(d)(ii) (1990).
127. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-11-782).
128. Id. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-794(2) (1990)).
129. Id. at 845, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing Barrie v. Kitsap Cy. Boundary Review Bd.
(Barrie III), 97 Wash. 2d 232, 235, 643 P.2d 433, 435 (1982)).
130. Id. at 846, 770 P.2d at 1069 (citing Barrie III, 97 Wash. 2d at 235-36, 643 P.2d at
435, which quotes from Nat'l Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649, 663-64
(D.N.M. 1980), aff'd sub noma. Nat'l Indian Youth Council v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th
Cir. 1981) (emphasis added)).
131. See Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 33-34, 785 P.2d
447, 455 (1990); Cheney v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 552 P.2d
184, 189 (1976); SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards, 49 Wash. App. 609, 614, 744 P.2d 1101,
[Vol. 15:957
SEPA: A Proposed Standard
According substantial weight to the SEPA administrative
rule and applying the reasonableness standard to the evidence,
the court found that the testimony of Mr. Esvelt did not consti-
tute significant new information for three reasons. 32 First, the
landfill's potential for contaminating water existed in 1978,133
and accordingly, the placement of the landfill on the National
Priorities List was a development that could be expected to
occur with the passage of time.' 34 Second, Mr. Esvelt's testi-
mony that runoff "could" affect methods of cleanup of the
landfill was too speculative to require a SEIS.131 Third, while
Mr. Esvelt expressed doubts regarding the use of grass percola-
tion areas to dispose of storm water runoff effectively, the 1978
EIS recognized that runoff water contains contaminants and
considered the effective removal of those contaminants. The
original project proposed to inject runoff directly into dry
wells, and Mr. Esvelt did not suggest that the grass percolation
areas as proposed by the current project presented a greater
impact. 136 Because the evidence did not constitute significant
new information, the Board's decision was not "clearly errone-
ous." As such, the court affirmed "the Board's determination
that the 1978 EIS was adequate for reviewing the impact of the
proposed mall on water quality.'1
37
West 514 next argued that Mr. Easton's testimony about
the effect of regional malls on central business districts consti-
tuted evidence that the proposed mall was a substantial change
that was likely to have significant adverse impacts on the envi-
ronment of downtown Spokane. 138 By statute, such a change,
if proved, requires preparation of a SEIS.13 e
In analyzing the issue, the court accorded substantial def-
erence to the relevant SEPA administrative rule stating that
1104 (1987); Mentor v. Kitsap County, 22 Wash. App. 285, 289, 588 P.2d 1226, 1229
(1978).
132. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 846, 770 P.2d at 1069.
133. Id. The court noted that "[i]n the prior EIS, W.R. Dobratz of the county
engineering department commented that '[t]he old landfill area should not be used for
subsurface waste water or storm water disposal . . . because of possible leachate
problems." Id. at 846, 770 P.2d at 1069.
134. Id
135. Id. at 846-47, 770 P.2d at 1069.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 847, 770 P.2d at 1069.
138. Id. at 847, 770 P.2d at 1069-70.
139. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-600(4)(d)(i) (1990). See also Save a
Neighborhood Env't v. City of Seattle, 101 Wash. 2d 280, 284, 676 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1987);
SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards, 49 Wash. App. 609, 613, 744 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1987).
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"economic competition, in and of itself, is not an environmen-
tal effect and need not be discussed in an EIS."' In this
regard, the court found that Mr. Easton's general testimony
failed to establish the probability or likelihood that the pro-
posed mall would have a significant adverse impact on the
physical environment of downtown Spokane and found that
the Board, as the finder of fact, was entitled to disregard Mr.
Easton's general predictions as not relevant to the issue.14 1 In
making this finding, the court implicitly relied on the reasona-
bleness standard. Because the SEPA administrative rule and
the testimony failed to establish the probability or likelihood
of significant adverse impacts on the physical environment, the
Board's decision was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the
court affirmed the Board's determination not to require a SEIS
on this issue.14
Finally, West 514 asserted that the Spokane County Plan-
ning Department erred in issuing the MDNS. West 514 argued
that the MDNS was conditioned on future environmental stud-
ies that had no mitigating effect and that, therefore, the
County made a DNS before the full impact of the mall was
understood. 143
In analyzing the issue, the court once again accorded sub-
stantial weight to the SEPA administrative rule,'" which
states as follows:
The purpose of this section is to allow clarifications or
changes to a proposal prior to making the threshold
determination.
(1) In making threshold determinations, an agency may con-
sider mitigation measures that the agency or applicant will
implement.
(3) [I]f the lead agency specifies mitigation measures on an
applicant's proposal that would allow it to issue a DNS, and
the proposal is clarified, changed, or conditioned to include
140. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 847, 770 P.2d at 1070 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 197-11-448(3)).
141. Id.
142. Id. The court noted that if the probable effect of competition is downtown
blight affecting the built environment, then discussion of the effect in an EIS is
necessary. Id. at 847-48, 770 P.2d at 1070 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2) and
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-444(2)).
143. West 514, 53 Wash. App. at 848, 770 P.2d at 1070.
144. Id. (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-350).
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the measures, the lead agency shall issue a DNS. (emphasis
added)
Case law requires that when a governmental agency
makes a negative threshold determination, it must show that
environmental facts were considered "in a manner sufficient to
amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural require-
ments of SEPA.'
'1 45
The court found that the MDNS was issued only after the
Planning Department adopted relevant parts of the 1978 EIS,
reviewed the new environmental checklist, and conditioned
approval of the project in conformance with the site plan,
except as modified by the studies specified in the MDNS.
1 4
1
Because the Planning Department complied with SEPA direc-
tives by adequately considering environmental factors before it
issued the MDNS, the court held that it was not clearly erro-
neous for the Planning Department to issue the MDNS.
D. Evaluation of the New Standard as Applied in West 514
Because the court applied a clearly erroneous standard of
review after reasonably evaluating the underlying environmen-
tal documents and according substantial weight to the SEPA
rules and the agency decision, the proper result was reached in
West 514. Unfortunately, after nearly two and one half years
in the appellate process, the project was abandoned.
Two of the West 514 appellants may not have been citizen
participants but may have been competitors seeking to delay a
project that the citizens of Spokane Valley supported.
147
Because the court reviewed the agency decision under the
clearly erroneous standard, after first reasonably examining
the underlying environmental documents and according the
agency decision substantial weight, the appellants were unable
to force the mall proponents to file a SEIS and further delay
the project. If a de novo standard of review were employed, the
145. Id. at 848-49, 770 P.2d at 1070 (citing Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash. 2d
78, 84, 569 P.2d 712, 716 (1977) and quoting Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v.
City of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140, review denied, 83 Wash. 2d 1002
(1973)).
146. Id. at 849, 770 P.2d at 1071.
147. The fact that the citizens of Spokane Valley supported the Liberty Lake Mall
is evidenced by petitions containing over 20,000 signatures of Spokane Valley citizens
and customers that supported the mall. Deposition of J. Phillip Richley taken on
January 31, 1990 and February 1, 1991, Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Magnuson,
No. C-89-823-RJM (E.D. Wash. 1989).
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court could have reached a different result. Similarly, if the
court had employed a clearly erroneous standard of review
without first reasonably determining whether the underlying
environmental documents were adequate, the appellants might
have prevailed.
The new standard of review should discourage lawsuits
that are brought merely for the purposes of delay and should
also enhance the ability of project proponents to forecast their
economic costs. Under this standard, SEPA plaintiffs must do
more than just persuade the court to substitute its judgment
for that of the finder of fact. Instead, to overturn the agency
decision, the plaintiffs must firmly convince the court that a
mistake has been committed. While the court must accord sub-
stantial weight to the agency decision, the court must also
employ a "reasonableness" analysis. Thus, if the agency has
not acted reasonably in relying on the underlying environmen-
tal documents and has made a mistake, then the court may
overturn the agency decision.
If this standard of judicial review had been in place prior
to the filing of the West 514 lawsuit, appellants may not have
brought the action because much of their case consisted of try-
ing to persuade the court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Board.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Washington law, judicial review of an agency deci-
sion not to require preparation of a SEIS may produce fortui-
tous results because the court may review both EIS adequacy
and the negative threshold determination. EIS adequacy is
reviewed under a de novo standard of review with or without
deference to the agency decision. However, negative threshold
determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review with deference to the agency decision. The
Ninth Circuit reviews negative threshold determinations under
a reasonableness standard.
To enable litigants to predict the outcome of SEPA litiga-
tion, a more definitive standard of review is necessary. The
new standard must effect the clear legislative mandate that
agency decisions and relevant SEPA rules be accorded substan-
tial weight. Additionally, to avoid overreaching by agencies,
the court should ensure that environmental documents are
reasonable.
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To fulfill these objectives, the court should initially apply
a reasonableness test to judge the adequacy of environmental
documents and accord the agency decision and applicable
SEPA rules substantial weight and then apply a clearly errone-
ous standard of review. This standard serves three objectives.
First, it allows litigants to predict more accurately the result of
challenges to agency determinations not to require a SEIS.
Second, it discourages spurious litigation brought merely for
the purpose of delay. Finally, it ensures that agencies do not
overreach their authority.
